Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:39 pm
Time: 11:39 pm
Results for terrorists (u.s.)
5 results foundAuthor: U.S. White House Title: Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: This strategy outlines how the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism. This strategy commits the Federal Government to improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online. Most of all, this strategy reafirms the fundamental American principles that guide our efforts, As we approach the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we remember that al-Qa’ida tried to spark a conflict between faiths and divide us as Americans. But they failed. As this strategy makes clear, we will not waver in defense of our country or our communities. We will defeat a1-Qa’ida and its affiliates. We will uphold the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. And we will go forward together, as Americans, knowing that our rich diversity of backgrounds and faiths makes us stronger and is a key to our national security. Details: Washington, DC: The White House, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf Shelf Number: 122386 Keywords: Extremist GroupsTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: Larance, Eileen R. Title: Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts Summary: The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 exposed weaknesses in how the federal government nominated individuals to the terrorist watchlist and gaps in how agencies used the list to screen individuals to determine if they posed a security threat. In response, the President tasked agencies to take corrective actions. GAO was asked to assess (1) government actions since the incident to strengthen the nominations process, (2) how the composition of the watchlist has changed based on these actions, and (3) how agencies are addressing gaps in screening processes. GAO analyzed government reports, the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist, data on the volumes of nominations from January 2009 through May 2011, the composition of the list, and the outcomes of screening agency programs. GAO also interviewed officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and screening agencies to discuss changes to policies, guidance, and processes and related impacts on agency operations and the traveling public, among other things. This report is a public version of the classified report that GAO issued in December 2011 and omits certain information, such as details on the nominations guidance and the specific outcomes of screening processes. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the outcomes and impacts of agencies’ actions to strengthen nominations and screening processes are routinely assessed. Technical comments were provided and incorporated. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-476: Accessed June 27, 2012 at: http://gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf Shelf Number: 125421 Keywords: Homeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: Krouse, William J. Title: Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms Summary: The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual’s firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of firearms background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law. Similarly, the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing could generate renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening, because at least one of the alleged perpetrators was possibly entered into the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC’s) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). As a consequence, he was possibly watch-listed in the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center’s Terrorist Screening Database—the U.S. government’s master watchlist of known and suspected terrorists. In addition, on April 18, 2013, both alleged perpetrators—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—are further alleged to have shot and killed a police officer, high-jacked an automobile and taken its owner hostage at gunpoint, and engaged in a subsequent shootout with police. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is tracing a pistol recovered at the scene of the shootout. If the watch-listed brother, Tamerlan, had acquired the pistol from a federally licensed gun dealer, it might have generated a terrorist watchlist hit through NICS. Critics could argue that watchlist hits through NICS, or border and aviation security screening systems, might have prompted federal investigators to scrutinize Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s travels and activities more closely prior to the bombing. As described in this report, moreover, a NICS-generated watchlist match might have prevented him from acquiring the pistol. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government reevaluated its terrorist screening procedures. As part of this process, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI modified the Brady background check procedures and recalibrated NICS to query an additional file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) that included terrorist watchlist records. Since February 2004, information related to the subjects of NICS-generated terrorist watchlist matches have been passed on to the FBI Counterterrorism Division and special agents in the field, who are usually members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These FBI agents, in turn, verify the match between the individual and the watchlist record, and they check for information that would prohibit that individual, the prospective transferee, licensee, or permittee, from possessing firearms or explosives (e.g., illegal immigration or fugitive status). While the modified NICS procedures initially generated little public opposition, those procedures called three possible issues into question. One, should terrorist watchlist checks be incorporated statutorily into the firearms- and explosives-related background check processes? Two, given certain statutory prohibitions related to prohibiting a firearms registry, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations have obtained firearms? Three, should the Attorney General be granted authority to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match? Since the 109th Congress, several related legislative proposals have been introduced. Several of those bills would have addressed the retention of firearms-related transfer records. Another proposal would have prohibited persons watch-listed as terrorists for aviation security purposes on the “No Fly” list from firearms transfer or possession eligibility. In the 110th Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King introduced a bill based on a legislative proposal developed by DOJ that would have authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms (and explosives) licenses/permits to “dangerous terrorists” (S. 1237/H.R. 2074). In the 111th Congress, they reintroduced this bill (S. 1317/H.R. 2159), which supporters dubbed the “Terror Gap” proposal. In the 112th Congress, they introduced similar bills (S. 34 and H.R. 1506). And, in the 113th Congress they reintroduced their bills (S. 34 and H.R. 720) once more. When the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649) in April 2013, Senator Lautenberg also filed an amendment (S.Amdt. 734) to that bill, which is nearly identical to S. 34. While the Senate leadership set S. 649 aside, if the Senate reconsiders this bill, it might also consider S.Amdt. 734. In addition, Representative James Moran has included similar provisions in the NRA Members’ Gun Safety Act of 2013 (H.R. 21). The Terror Gap proposal raises several potential issues for Congress. One, should the Attorney General notify watch-listed individuals who have been deemed to be “dangerous terrorists” for the purposes of gun control? Two, what form of redress and/or remedy would be provided to individuals wrongfully denied a firearm transfer because they were misidentified, or improperly watch-listed, and then deemed to be a “dangerous terrorist”? Three, if enacted, would such a law draw unwanted attention to related terrorist screening procedures, possibly undermining the effectiveness of these procedures by making terrorists and other adversaries aware of them, and possibly setting a judicial review precedent for other terrorist watchlist screening processes? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: R42336: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Shelf Number: 128858 Keywords: Background ChecksFirearmsHomeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: Constitution Project Title: The Report of the Constitution Project's Task Force on Detainee Treatment Summary: The Constitution Project's independent, bipartisan, blue-ribbon Task Force on Detainee Treatment examined the federal government's policies and actions related to the capture, detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists in U.S. custody during the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. Created late in 2010, the goal of the Task Force was to provide the American people with a broad understanding of what is known-and what may still be unknown-about the past and current treatment of suspected terrorists detained by the U.S. government. The Task Force identified detention policies and practices that will help America to better comply with the nation's legal obligations, foreign policy objectives and democratic values. Details: Washington, DC: The Constitution Project, 2013. 560p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 30, 2014 at:http://detaineetaskforce.org/report/ Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://detaineetaskforce.org/report/ Shelf Number: 133872 Keywords: DetaineesTerrorismTerrorist DetentionTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: Cole, Jared P. Title: Terrorist Databases and the No Fly List: Procedural Due Process and Hurdles to Litigation Summary: In order to protect national security, the government maintains various terrorist watchlists, including the "No Fly" list, which contains the names of individuals to be denied boarding on commercial airline flights. Travelers on the No Fly list are not permitted to board an American airline or any flight on a foreign air carrier that lands or departs from U.S. territory or flies over U.S. airspace. Some persons have claimed that their alleged placement on the list was the result of an erroneous determination by the government that they posed a national security threat. In some cases, it has been reported that persons have been prevented from boarding an aircraft because they were mistakenly believed to be on the No Fly list, sometimes on account of having a name similar to another person who was actually on the list. As a result, various legal challenges to placement on the list have been brought in court. The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Accordingly, when a person has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the government must follow certain procedures. Several courts have found that placement on the No Fly list may impair constitutionally protected interests, including the right to travel internationally, and the government's redress procedures must therefore satisfy due process. Typically, due process requires that the government provide a person with notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral party. However, the requirements of due process are not fixed, and can vary according to relevant factors. When determining the proper procedural protections in a given situation, courts employ the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, which weighs the private interests affected against the government's interest. Courts applying this balancing test might consider several factors, including the severity of the deprivation involved in placement on the No Fly list. In addition, courts may examine the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedural framework and the potential value of imposing additional procedures on the process. Finally, courts may inquire into the government's interest in preserving the status quo, including the danger of permitting plaintiffs to access sensitive national security information. Resolution of the issue is currently pending as at least two federal courts have ruled that the government's redress procedures for travelers challenging placement on the No Fly list violate due process. The government is currently revising this process, although the precise details of what the new program will entail are unclear. Litigation is further complicated by several legal hurdles, such as the state secrets privilege, that can bar plaintiffs from accessing certain information during litigation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43730: Accessed April 15, 2015 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Shelf Number: 135235 Keywords: Due ProcessHomeland SecurityNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |